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1ABSTRACT
A sufficient and appropriate degree of central bank independence is widely acknowledged to be 
necessary for the goal of achieving price stability. However, despite the levels of independence 
claimed to be enjoyed by several central banks, recent events indicate shifts in focus of monetary 
policy objectives by various prominent central banks.
The impact of political and government influences on central banks' monetary policies has been 
evidenced from the recent financial crisis – and in several jurisdictions. Many central banks have 
adjusted monetary policies having been influenced by political pressures which have built up as a 
result of the recent crises. However such lack of absolute independence (from political spheres) 
could prove symbiotic in the sense that, despite the need for a certain degree of independence 
from  political  interference,  certain  events  which  are  capable  of  devastating  consequences, 
namely, a drastic disruption of the system's financial stability, need to be responded to as quickly 
and promptly as possible. Is it possible for a central bank with absolute independence to operate 
effectively – particularly given the close links between many central banks and their Treasury in 
several countries? 
It may be inferred  that  central  banks'  crucial  roles  in  establishing  a  macro  prudential 
framework   provide  the  key  to  bridging  the  gap  between  macro  economic  policy  and  the 
regulation of individual financial institutions. This however, on its own, is insufficient – close 
collaboration  and  effective  information sharing  between  central  banks  and  regulatory 
authorities is paramount. 
Key Words:  central  banks,  stability,  regulation,  financial  crises,  macro prudential,  Basel  III, 
systemic risk, supervision, liquidity, monetary policy, inflation targeting
2CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: MONETARY POLICIES IN SELECTED 
JURISDICTIONS (III)
Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
The US Federal  Reserve  Act  of  1913,  “an important  example  of  a  central  bank whose  law 
includes  other  objectives  such  as  growth  and  employment  and  the  stability  of  the  financial 
system in addition to monetary stability,“2 illustrates the need for the Fed Reserve to take into 
considerations matters relating to fiscal policy when determining monetary policy objectives and 
further;
Fiscal policy measures (such as taxes and government spending etc) are determined by Congress 
and the Government and these decisions also impact the Fed Reserve's decisions in relation to 
monetary policy. Hence the Fed Reserve cannot really be considered to be a central bank which 
is totally independent from the executive.
This is to be contrasted to the situation with Germany's pre 1999 Bundesbank whereby it  is 
highlighted  that  „price  stability  was  the  primary  objective.  The  secondary  objective  of  the 
Bundesbank was to support the general economic policies of the Government (including growth 
and employment).“3 Hence the central bank having not just a primary focus on price stability but 
also a secondary focus/secondary objective. Fiscal policy measures and objectives appear to be 
1 Email : marianneojo@hotmail.com
2  See RM  Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability Oxford University Press (2006) at page 5
3  Ibid at page 11
3the primary focus of the Fed Reserve as of recent - given the recent recovery measures which 
have had to be undertaken in response to the global financial crisis and given the  wider scope of 
application in its approach to inflation targeting. Further, it is observed that “the Fed’s focus has 
shifted  dramatically  to  the  short-run  objective  of  lowering  unemployment  and  recently  the 
willingness to (temporarily?) set aside its inflation target.”4
Mervyn King's reference5 to central  bank independence in the UK highlights the importance 
being accredited to the ever increasing and significant role of monetary policy. He adds :"How 
much discretion to give to the Monetary Policy Committe and how much should remain with the 
Chancellor is an interesting question that was raised, but not fully resolved, in 1997," he added, 
referring to the date when the Bank gained operational independence.“6
However, despite the growing importance of, and emphasis on central bank independence: as 
highlighted  under  the  abstract,  lack  of  absolute  independence  (from political  spheres)  could 
prove symbiotic in the sense that, despite the need for a certain degree of independence from 
political interference, certain events which are capable of devastating consequences, namely, a 
drastic  disruption of the system's financial  stability,  need to  be responded to as quickly and 
promptly as  possible.  Further,  subjecting  actions  and  decisions  of  the  central  bank  to  other 
authorities  could  actually  incorporate  greater  accountability  and  transparency  into  the 
supervisory and regulatory framework.
4 M  Levy, Shadow Open Market Committee, “Monetary Policy, Little Economic Impact, High Risks at page 6 
http://shadowfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Levy-SOMC-Nov2012.pdf
5  See also Mervyn King's reference to the Fed's decision to state levels which unemployment would probably need 
to fall to before it started to raise interest rates –  an affirmation of the impact of fiscal measures on monetary 
policy decisions. Reuters, „Bank of England's King Says Time to Review Inflation Targeting“ 22nd January 2013 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/22/britain-boe-king-idUSL9E8E503Q20130122> (last accessed 25th 
March 2013)
6 See ibid
4In relation to legislative reforms which result in a reduction in central bank autonomy and with 
particular reference to recent amendments to the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007, it has been 
noted  by  several  commentators  generally,  that  a  reduction  in  central  bank  autonomy  by 
subjecting its actions and decisions to legislative procedures and approvals, could result in more 
serious problems which would aggravate the stability of the economy and financial system.
However it needs to be added that the issue does not necessarily relate to a subjection of actions 
and decisions for approvals, but how well the authorities involved are able to communicate and 
coordinate information between them effectively.
B Central  Bank Independence:  Its  Relevance  in  Developed and Less  Developed  
Economies and Political Systems
Even  though  a  sufficient  and  appropriate  degree  of  central  bank  independence  is  widely 
acknowledged  to  be  necessary  for  the  goal  of  achieving  price  stability,  it  has  also  been 
concluded  by  Hayo  and  Hefeker  that  central  bank  independence  is  “neither  necessary  nor 
sufficient for monetary stability.”7 Maliszweski8 further, concludes that „statistical significance 
of central bank independence at the high level of  liberalisation,  as well as  the  timing of 
stabilisation attempts and reforms of central  bank laws, suggest that the independence  is a 
powerful device for protecting price stability, but not for stabilising the price level.”
Central bank independence – its impact and significance on the economy, financial system and 
the goal of achieving price stability, requires a consideration of historical, legal, jurisdictional, 
political and other economic factors. As regards jurisdictional factors and with respect to less 
7  B Hayo and C Hefeker, “Reconsidering Central Bank Independence” European Journal of Political Economy 18 
(2002) 653–674  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
8 W Maliszweski, „Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies“ 2000 at page 18 of 28 
<http://depot.gdnet.org/gdnshare/pdf/818_Wojciech.pdf>
5developed  countries  (and  not  so  well  developed  economies),  the  need  for  central  bank 
independence  (and  in  particular  operational  and  financial  independence  from  political 
institutions), it appears, assumes greater importance.
According to the Memorandum Submitted to the National Assembly in Respect of the Proposed 
Amendments to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act, 2007:9 Financial independence for a 
central bank has four ingredients namely: 
–  The right to determine its own budget; 
– The application of central bank-specific accounting rules; 
– Clear provisions on the distribution of profits; and 
– Clearly defined financial liability for supervisoryauthorities. 
Further  the  Memorandum states  that  “these are  particularly  relevant  especially  in  not-well-
developed political systems where central banks are most vulnerable to outside influence.„10
In an empirical analysis, performed by Moser,11 a distinction is made between three groups of 
countries: 
Those with strong checks and balances in their legislation, those with weak checks and balances, 
and those with no checks and balances. 
Moser finds that:12 
9  Publication date 2012 , see page 4 of 34
10    The Memorandum also states that “a situation where the C B N’s  independence is  curtailed will  inhibit its 
ability  to achieve one of its critical roles of providing standby loans to distressed banks. The absence of this form 
of insurance to the banking sector will increase the industry’s perceived riskiness, reduceoverall confidence in it 
and therefore reduce growth of the sector and economy.“ see ibid at page 12
11  B Hayo and C Hefeker, “Reconsidering Central Bank Independence” European Journal of Political Economy 18 
(2002) at page 666 and 667
12„In a second step, he regresses group dummies for checks and balances plus these dummies interacted with 
Central Bank Independence (CBI) on average inflation rates. The outcome of this regression is less straightforward. 
In particular, the shift term of the country group with no checks and balances is smaller than that of the other 
groups. This implies that countries with dependent central banks do not necessarily have higher inflation rates. In 
61) Countries with strong checks and balances have more independent central banks compared to 
those with weak or no checks and balances. 
2)The countries in the last group have the most dependent central banks. 
C Fiscal and Monetary Policy Objectives: The Essence of Narrowing the Scope of 
Inflation Targeting
The distinction between fiscal and monetary policy objectives – as well as the focus of fiscal 
policy objectives on growth and employment; and the focus of monetary policy objectives on 
price stability, is certainly not a contentious matter. Lastra highlights the dual nature of monetary 
stability – „in addition to the internal dimension,  there is  also an external dimension,  which 
refers to the value of the currency. The stability of exchange rates (the exchange rate being the 
price  of  a  currency  in  another  currency)  and  the  issue  of  which  is  the  best  exchange  rate 
arrangement for a given country.“
„Under the Keynesian policy modalities of the 1950s and 1960s fiscal policy had primacy and  
demand management policies (goals of growth and employment) were prevalent.“
Should inflation targeting be accorded a  more prominent  role  in  many jurisdictions or  what 
factors are necessary in order for greater focus to be accorded to monetary policy objectives? 
What reforms will be required in order to achieve the objective of according greater priority to 
inflation targeting? Currently in the UK, efforts are being undertaken to recommence with bond 
purchasing or reduce interest rates – although it is added that more fundamental changes and 
reforms  will  be  required  –  as  opposed to  a  proposed  „fine  tuning“  of  the  present  scope  of 
inflation targeting.
Other areas worthy of consideration include:
our framework, this can be interpreted as evidence that some countries have found other means to achieve low 
inflation rates. It is worth pointing out that the proxy used by Moser to measure the legislative framework is limited 
in scope, and he might miss distinctive features of the legal framework of some countries.“ see ibid
7− Merits of targeting the size of the economy in cash terms instead of inflation.
− Reviewing the arrangements for setting monetary policies
Would  merely  a  cut  in  interest  rates  be  sufficient  to  boost  the  economy  –  given  several 
considerations (amongst which include the fact that banks, building societies' interests also need 
to be taken into account)? To what extent does unemployment need to fall before a central bank 
decides to raise interest rates? Why should greater pre eminence be given to monetary policy 
objectives than was previously the case? It has been demonstrated in several jurisdictions that 
inflation rates are usually higher than their targets – and this being consistently the case given the 
impact and influence of Government fiscal measures on monetary policy objectives. However, 
an absolute independence of the central bank from Government (which is certainly not logical or 
feasible) is not advocated for, since there should be some degree of communication between 
Treasury and the central bank. The consequences of lack of effective communication between the 
regulator of financial services (the FSA), the central bank (Bank of England) and the Treasury 
were evident during the Northern Rock Crisis.
Hence regulatory structural  reforms are also required – in addition to the implementation of 
certain  measures  aimed  at  ensuring  that  the  central  bank  is  not  overly influenced  by those 
authorities for determining fiscal policy measures, or that the central bank is not insufficiently 
placed at the required level of communication with those authorities responsible for setting fiscal 
policy measures. 
Furthermore  a  grant  of  greater  or  reduced  powers  to  the  central  bank  would  also  require 
consideration of the system of checks and balances in operation.  In view of regulatory reforms, 
two categories merit consideration:
8i)  Reviewing  the  structure  of  financial  regulation  (which  involves  whether  the  structure  of 
regulation is that of a unified financial services regulator or functional regulator. It also involves 
whether  greater  powers  should  be  granted  or  entrusted  to  central  banks).  There  are  several 
debates revolving round whether the Fed should be granted more powers – given the degree of 
powers it already possesses. However, there are also several grounds for arguing that supervisory 
powers should be transferred back from the UK's Financial Services Authority, to the Bank of 
England.
ii)  Reviewing  the  system of  regulation  (on  site  and  off  site  system of  supervision  –  which 
embraces  the  financial  regulator's  use  of  external  auditors  in  exercising  certain  regulatory 
functions). The use of external auditors should also serve as a means of incorporating increased 
checks and accountability into the regulatory process. The transfer of supervisory powers back to 
the Bank of England this year, should signify an era which introduces (or rather re introduces) 
greater implementation of external auditors' expertise – in contrast to the reduced level of use of 
external auditors by its predecessor, the Financial Services Authority.
Focus on low long term interest rates appears, it seems, to be a recipe for the success attained by 
Canada's central bank. Should such a policy simply be adopted by other jurisdictions or should 
present  existing  institutional  frameworks  and historical  considerations  be  taken into  account 
before deciding to adopt certain measures? Certainly jurisdictional specific factors, as well as 
legal, political, economic and other factors which vary over time, need to be considered – even 
though regulatory structural reforms may still be required.
Sola et al13 argue that the central bank in Brazil has been able to gain increasing discipline over 
the monetary system, partly owing to:
13  L Sola, C Garman and M  Marques, “Central Banking, Democratic Governance and Political Authority: The 
Case of Brazil in a Comparative Perspective. Revista de Economia Politica Vol 18, no 2 (70) Abil-Junho, 1998 at 
page 129 http://www.rep.org.br/pdf/70-8.pdf
9– The economic stabilisation plan and, not;
– As a result of prediction premised on conventional wisdom, 
namely, not on the basis of the argument that price stability follows from an autonomous central 
bank. Further, they argue that economic stabilisation has less to do with “getting the institutions 
right”  and that  it  is  more  consequential  of  a  dynamic  bargaining  game between the  federal 
executive, legislators and sub national governments.” The substantial shift in the political game 
between legislators, the executive nad governors, during the 90s, is also highlighted.
Rogolon adds  that  the  positive  theory reveals  that  the  degree  of  independence  is  negatively 
correlated with the mean inflation, the inflation variability and the inflationary uncertainty, but is 
positively correlated with the credibility of monetary policy. And further, that practice as regards 
the Brazilian experience involves discussions of the importance of the Central Bank of Brazil's 
independence  for  the  efficiency of  the  stabilization  policy,  focusing  on  the  periods  of  high 
inflation (1980/1993) and moderate inflation (1994/...).14
D. CONCLUSION 
It was illustrated in the previous section that whilst regulatory structural reforms are required in 
certain jurisdictions before goals relating to price stability can be achieved, certain country and 
jurisdictional  experiences  highlight  the  fact  that  economic  stabilisation  has  less  to  do  with 
“getting  the  institutions  right”  and  that  it  is  more  consequential  of  “a  dynamic  bargaining 
game.”Certain jurisdictions have been engaged in legislational reforms not necessarily aimed at 
increasing central bank independence but targeted at achieving price and economic stabilisation.  
14  F Rogolon „Central Bank Independence: Theory and a Brazilian Application“ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=56203
10
 Hence it is to be concluded that central bank independence, though an essential contributor to 
price stability – depending on jurisdictional considerations, cannot be considered to be the sole 
determining  factor  in  predicting  a  country  or  economy's  state  of  monetary  stability.  Theory 
appears  to  support  the  widely  accepted  view  that  central  bank  independence  is  a  principal 
contributory  factor  to  price  and  monetary  stability.  However  investigations  and  empirical 
evidence relating to developed, transition and developing economies higlight distinct trends in 
relationships between central bank independence, price stability and levels of inflation.
As concluded by Sola et al, “in studying monetary authority and central bank institutions, the 
analyst  should  identify  the  relevant  actors,  their  interests,  and  how  economic  and  political 
conjunctures are able to shift the relevant bargaining position of those very actors.”15 To which it 
is also to be added that legal, political, historical considerations, as well as various other factors 
(considered in this paper) also merit special focus.
15 L Sola, C Garman and M  Marques, “Central Banking, Democratic Governance and Political Authority: The Case 
of Brazil in a Comparative Perspective. Revista de Economia Politica Vol 18, no 2 (70) Abil-Junho, 1998 at page 
130
11
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